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 Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement
 Regime
 Sarah L. Stafford*
 This paper adds to the debate over whether self-policing can increase environmental protection
 by considering an issue that has been ignored in previous models?that self-policing may
 influence future enforcement. The model combines self-policing with targeted enforcement and
 allows for both deliberate and inadvertent violations. As expected, rewarding self-policers with
 more lenient future enforcement increases auditing, remediation, and disclosure of inadvertent
 violations. Self-policing can also serve as a complement to deliberate compliance and can thus
 further increase environmental performance. However, under reasonable conditions, self
 policing can be a substitute for deliberate compliance and could therefore be detrimental to
 environmental protection.
 JEL Classification: K32, K42, Q52, Q58
 1. Introduction
 There is an on-going debate in both the theoretical and empirical literature about the
 effectiveness of self-policing policies such as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Audit
 Policy. The EPA consistently publicizes the Audit Policy as a successful, innovative approach to
 compliance. For example, the introduction to EPA's 2002 Enforcement and Compliance
 Assurance Report, "Environmental Results through Smart Enforcement," includes the 26%
 increase in companies that self-disclose violations as one of the year's highlights (U.S. EPA 2003,
 p. 4). However, Pfaff and Sanchirico's (2004) finding that the typical self-disclosed violation is
 relatively insignificant leads them to question whether the Audit Policy is as effective as the EPA
 claims. Similarly, Stafford (2005) examines compliance with hazardous waste regulations before
 and after the establishment of the federal Audit Policy and does not find any significant evidence
 that the federal Audit Policy has affected overall compliance.1
 The theoretical literature on self-policing is also mixed. While many theoretical models of
 self-policing show that it can increase environmental protection (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell 1994;
 Innes 1999a), other models demonstrate how self-policing can have significant negative effects
 (e.g., Heyes 1996; Friesen 2006). This paper adds to the debate over the ability of self-policing
 to increase environmental protection by considering one aspect of self-policing that has been
 ignored in previous models?that self-policing may influence future enforcement activity.
 * The College of William & Mary, Department of Economics, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA; E-mail
 slstaf@wm.edu.
 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from Resources for the Future and EPA's STAR Grant
 Program (Grant Number R831036).
 Received January 2007; accepted September 2007.
 1 However the results suggest that state audit legislation and self-policing policies may decrease violations of hazardous
 waste regulations.
 934
This content downloaded from 128.239.120.254 on Mon, 02 Jul 2018 20:54:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Self-Policing and Targeted Enforcement 935
 EPA's Audit Policy provides incentives for regulated facilities to conduct environmental
 audits and voluntarily self-police by offering significant penalty reductions for any disclosed
 violations that meet certain eligibility criteria. Additionally, the EPA's website for
 environmental auditing notes that when regulated facilities self-police, it can render "formal
 EPA investigations and enforcement actions unnecessary."2 Although the EPA website implies
 that self-policing can affect future enforcement activity and Stafford (2007) finds that self
 disclosures do decrease the probability of future inspections, to date all theoretical models of
 self-policing are essentially static models.
 This paper adds to the existing theoretical literature on self-policing by incorporating self
 policing into Harrington's (1988) dynamic targeted enforcement model. The paper then
 investigates the effect of self-policing on facility behavior and examines the circumstances under
 which self-policing can increase environmental protection and the circumstances under which it
 can be detrimental. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
 brief description of EPA's self-policing policy; section 3 reviews the theoretical literature on
 self-policing; section 4 presents a theoretical model of self-policing in a targeted enforcement
 regime; section 5 discusses the implications of self-policing for environmental performance
 under this model; and section 6 concludes.
 2. EPA's Self-Policing Policy
 In December of 1995 EPA issued "Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
 Correction and Prevention of Violations," which encouraged facilities to voluntarily undertake
 environmental audits and provided incentives for facilities to voluntarily disclose and correct
 any violations of environmental regulations discovered by the audit.3 Because this policy
 evolved from an EPA effort to encourage environmental auditing, the self-policing policy is
 more commonly referred to as the Audit Policy. Under the Audit Policy, any facility that
 voluntarily identifies, discloses, and corrects violations of environmental regulations is eligible
 for a reduction in the penalties associated with those violations. To be eligible for a complete
 waiver of punitive penalties, the self-disclosure must meet nine conditions:
 i. Systematic discovery: Discovery must either take place during an environmental audit or
 during a self-evaluation that is part of a due diligence program,
 ii. Voluntary discovery: The process through which the violation is discovered cannot be
 required by federal, state, or local authorities and cannot be required by statutes,
 regulations, permits, or consent agreements,
 iii. Prompt disclosure: Violations must be disclosed within 21 days of discovery,
 iv. Independent discovery and disclosure: The disclosure cannot be made after an inspection
 or investigation has been announced or notice of a suit has been given,
 v. Correction and remediation: Any harm from the violation must be remediated and the
 violation must be corrected within 60 days of the date of discovery unless technological
 issues are a factor,
 vi. No recurrence: The facility must identify why the violation occurred and take steps to
 ensure that it won't recur.
 2 See http://www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/index.html, last accessed January 11, 2007.
 3 60 Federal Register 66705, December 22, 1995.
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 vii. No repeat violations: The same or a closely related violation cannot have occurred within
 the past three years at the facility or within the past five years at other facilities owned by
 the same parent organization.
 viii. Not excluded: No serious harm or imminent endangerment to human health and the
 environment can have occurred as a result of the violation and the violation cannot have
 been a violation of an order, consent agreement, or plea agreement,
 ix. Cooperation: The facility must cooperate with EPA, including providing all requested
 documents.
 The Audit Policy does not apply to the portion of the penalty that is based on the economic
 benefit gained from noncompliance. For example, if a facility neglects to sample a particular
 waste stream for several months and discovers this violation through an environmental audit,
 assuming the violation meets all of the conditions above, the facility would receive a complete
 reduction in the punitive portion of the penalty but would continue to owe a penalty equal to the
 savings it received from not having conducted those samples. This requirement is necessary to
 ensure that regulated entities have no incentive to deliberately violate and then self-police. In the
 preceding example, there would be no benefit to deliberately not sampling and then self-policing
 if the regulated entity has to pay the cost of sampling after disclosure.
 In 2005, approximately 1500 facilities self-disclosed a violation under the Audit Policy. To
 put this number in context, during this same time frame, 21,000 facilities were inspected or
 evaluated by EPA, and approximately 1.1 million facilities were subject to EPA regulation.4
 Facilities disclose violations of all of EPA's environmental statutes including the Clean Air Act,
 the Clean Water Act, and the Emergency Planning & Community Right-To-Know Act. An
 analysis of disclosures made in the early years of the Audit Policy (1994-1999) conducted by
 Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) found that the majority of disclosed violations were reporting and
 recordkeeping violations. Since that early analysis, the number of disclosures has risen
 significantly and the distribution of disclosures across statutes has shifted somewhat.
 Unfortunately, EPA's database of disclosures does not contain enough information to conduct
 a similar analysis of more recent disclosures to determine whether the pattern of disclosures
 found by Pfaff and Sanchirico still holds. However, I can use more recent data to determine the
 typical penalty reduction. During the 2001-2005 period, data on penalty reduction is available
 for 70% of the disclosures received by EPA. Of these disclosures, 97% (or over two-thirds of all
 of the disclosures) resulted in a complete waiver of all penalties.5
 3. Theoretical Literature on Self-Policing
 The term "self-policing" is used in this paper and by EPA to denote a situation in which a
 facility voluntarily notifies authorities that it has violated a regulation.6 In keeping with EPA's
 4 Disclosure and inspection data from "Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Results: Numbers at a Glance Fiscal
 Year 2005," http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2005/2005numbers.html. Data on regu
 lated facilities were taken from EPA's Envirofacts Database.
 5 These calculations are based on data from EPA's database of voluntary disclosures for fiscal years 2001-2005 obtained
 under the Freedom of Information Act.
 6 Other authors such as Kaplow and Shavell (1994) have termed this same activity "self-reporting." However, EPA uses
 the term self-reporting to denote a broader range of activities such as the requirement that facilities self-report
 emissions data to the Toxics Release Inventory.
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 use of the term, in this paper the act of self-policing does not require the remediation of
 environmental damages caused by the violation.7 However, for facilities to fully benefit from
 EPA's Audit Policy, they must remediate any damages that result from the self-disclosed
 violation.
 A number of theoretical papers have examined the concept of voluntary self-policing in a
 static setting. Kaplow and Shavell (1994) model a probabilistic enforcement regime in which
 facilities deliberately choose between compliance and noncompliance. The authors show that
 introducing self-policing will not affect deterrence as long as self-policers face a reduced fine
 equal to the certainty equivalent of the sanction they would face if they did not disclose but
 instead took their chances that the violation would be discovered. Additionally, self-policing
 will result in a welfare improvement because enforcement effort is reduced because self-policers
 need not be inspected. Moreover, if individuals are risk averse rather than risk neutral, Kaplow
 and Shavell show that self-policing can lead to welfare improvements through the reduction of
 risk.
 Innes (1999a) extends this model by considering the potential benefits of remediation
 under a self-policing policy. Innes models the compliance decision as a continuous choice in the
 level of care that the facility expends, with the probability of environmental harm inversely
 related to the level of care. Facilities costlessly observe whether harm has occurred and can
 choose whether to remediate the harm immediately. Regulators engage in monitoring efforts
 and the probability that regulators detect environmental harm at a facility is increasing in
 monitoring effort. In this model, facilities will self-police and remediate as long as they pay a
 reduced fine equal to the expected penalty they would pay if they did not self-police. Under
 such a regime, the level of remediation will increase because self-policers remediate with
 certainty while nondisclosers only remediate when caught. Therefore self-policing can be
 welfare enhancing even if enforcement costs are not reduced. Moreover, the optimal penalty
 can be increased relative to a nonself-policing regime, resulting in a lower level of monitoring
 for a given level of deterrence, and thus lower enforcement costs. However, as shown in Innes
 (1999b), there may be a reduction of the initial level of care taken by regulated facilities because
 of the ability to self-police. Innes (2001) also shows that if violators can engage in avoidance
 activities, self-policing can increase efficiency by reducing such activities and, in turn, allowing
 the government to achieve the same level of deterrence with a reduced enforcement effort.8
 Heyes (1996) incorporates self-policing into a model of environmental compliance;
 although, in this model, self-policing is not an independent choice because regulated facilities
 cannot remediate violations without disclosing such actions to regulators. As in Innes' models,
 facilities choose a level of preventative effort that inversely affects the probability that a facility
 will cause environmental harm. Facilities costlessly observe whether harm has occurred and can
 choose whether to remediate the harm immediately. Heyes assumes that remediation cannot be
 done covertly and thus remediation is, in effect, self-policing. If facilities do not self-police, the
 harm may be detected by the regulator with probability less than 1. Additionally, the cost of
 remediation increases if not done immediately. Heyes shows that decreasing the fine faced by
 self-policers relative to the fine for detected harm increases the level of self-policing. However,
 7 In contrast, Innes (1999b) uses the term self-policing to denote a situation where facilities voluntarily clean up or
 remediate environmental damages prior to detection. In that paper, disclosure is not required as a part of self-policing.
 8 Because avoidance activities are reduced, the cost of increasing penalty levels is reduced and the government can
 substitute higher penalties for lower enforcement effort.
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 decreasing the fine faced by self-polluters can also decrease the initial level of care taken by
 regulated facilities.
 Mishra, Newman, and Stinson (1997) construct a model of self-policing that is designed to
 capture specific aspects of EPA's Audit Policy. Because the focus of the model is on a facility's
 incentive to conduct a compliance audit and self-police, compliance is exogenous. More
 specifically, the model assumes that violations are probabilistic and do not depend on the
 facility's actions. Moreover, facilities can learn of their compliance status only through
 compliance audits, which are costly. Because remediation costs increase over time, facilities
 may audit to reduce expected costs given the likelihood of being caught later and forced to
 remediate at a higher cost. In this model, welfare improvements result only from increased
 remediation and decreased enforcement effort, not from increased deterrence.
 Friesen (2006) also assumes that violations are probabilistic and do not depend on the
 facility's actions. Facilities learn of their compliance status through costly compliance audits
 and must decide first whether to audit and then whether to disclose any violations that are
 discovered. Regulators must decide whether to inspect a facility, but inspections are subject to
 error and violations are discovered with a probability less than 1. However, the probability of
 discovering a violation increases if the facility has conducted an environmental audit. Assuming
 that facilities must remediate any disclosed violations, Friesen shows that facilities will only
 audit if they intend to remediate the violation, although not all facilities will disclose their
 remediated violations. Friesen also shows that the regulator will not inspect a facility that has
 disclosed a violation. However, auditing will generally occur with probability less than 1 in
 equilibrium and thus self-policing does not preclude the need for regulator monitoring.
 Moreover, policies that encourage self-policing can lead to duplication of effort and thus be
 inefficient. Although Friesen's model does allow regulators to incorporate self-policing into
 their enforcement strategy, the model is not dynamic in the sense that regulated facilities and
 regulators repeatedly interact and optimal actions take future consequences of one's actions
 into account. To date, no model of self-policing incorporates such dynamic considerations.9
 4. A Dynamic Model of Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime
 Harrington's (1988) model of targeted enforcement is the starting point for this dynamic
 model of self-policing.10 Harrington's model was developed as a response to a widespread
 perception that facilities in the United States were "overcomplying" with environmental
 regulations given the low probability that a facility would be inspected and the relatively minor
 fines that a facility would receive if found to be in violation. Harrington demonstrates how a
 targeted enforcement regime can leverage enforcement resources and maintain a higher level of
 compliance than can be obtained through more traditional, nontargeted enforcement.
 9 Livernois and McKenna (1999) present a dynamic model of self-reporting (as opposed to self-policing) in which
 firms choose whether to comply and whether to truthfully report their compliance status. Regulators use fines and
 inspection probabilities to both maximize initial compliance and induce truthful reporting (which ultimately leads to
 quicker remediation).
 10 While Harrington was not the first to introduce targeted or state-dependent enforcement (see, e.g., Landsberger and
 Meilijson 1982), he was the first to develop a model of targeted enforcement in an environmental context.
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 While Harrington's model has received some criticism in the theoretical literature,
 anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that the targeted enforcement model is consistent
 with current EPA enforcement practices.11 For example, the introduction to the Fiscal Year
 2002 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Report states that EPA's enforcement approach
 includes using "data analysis and other relevant information to marshal and leverage resources
 to target significant noncompliance" (EPA 2003, p. 3). Perhaps the most direct empirical test of
 the applicability of the targeted enforcement model to environmental regulation is that of
 Heiland (1998), which examines enforcement of the Clean Water Act using data on the pulp
 and paper industry and finds that the results are generally consistent with targeted enforcement.
 This model incorporates self-policing into Harrington's targeted enforcement model. As in
 the original model, regulated facilities are divided into two groups based on past compliance.
 Facilities with poor compliance records are placed in a target group and inspected with a higher
 probability than facilities in the nontarget group. Facilities found in violation of regulations are
 always moved into the target group while facilities found to be in compliance can transition to
 the nontarget group with some positive probability. Each period, facilities choose whether to
 comply. The regulator then inspects the facility with a probability based on the facility's group.
 Depending on the results of the inspection, facilities may be moved from one group to the other
 before the next period. Facilities that are not inspected stay in their group for the next period.
 As shown in Harrington (1988), this type of enforcement regime can lead to higher levels of
 compliance than would occur under a regime where all facilities face the same probability of
 inspection.12
 Following the Harrington model, regulators classify all regulated facilities into one of two
 groups: G\ is the "good" group and G2 is the targeted or "bad" group. Inspection probabilities
 vary across the groups with the inspection probability for G\ (tt) less than the inspection
 probability for G2 (p). However, unlike the Harrington model, there are two possible types of
 noncompliance, deliberate and inadvertent. Deliberate violations occur when a facility
 knowingly violates the regulations, for example, by sending hazardous waste to a
 nonhazardous waste landfill for disposal. An inadvertent violation occurs when a facility
 unknowingly violates the regulations (e.g., if one of its storage tanks is leaking) or violates
 without intending to (e.g., if hazardous materials are accidentally spilled on the ground).13 The
 model includes two types of compliance because EPA's self-policing policy cannot be applied to
 all violations.14 Given that Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) speculate that some facilities may self
 police to cover up other types of violations at a facility, including both types of violations in the
 model allows us to investigate the effect of self-policing on behavior that is not subject to self
 policing. This compliance paradigm is similar to that of Livernois and McKenna (1999),
 11 The criticism focuses on two main points: the "optimal" enforcement scheme does not minimize the costs of pollution
 control and the results may not hold under all information or cost structures. See, for example, Harford and
 Harrington (1991) and Raymond (1999).
 12 There have been a number of extensions to Harrington's basic model (for example, Harford and Harrington 1991 and
 Friesen 2003). However, none has incorporated self-policing.
 13 Although I refer to the two types of compliance as deliberate and inadvertent, the key distinction is that the deliberate
 violations are endogenous while inadvertent violations are exogenous. To simplify the model, I have made inadvertent
 violations completely endogenous, although in reality facilities have choices over types of equipment that can affect
 the probability that a violation will occur.
 14 As discussed in section 2, some violations are expressly omitted from the Audit Policy, such as repeated violations,
 violations of an order, consent agreement, or plea agreement, and violations that result in serious actual harm to
 human health and the environment.
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 Table 1. Notation Used in the Model
 Symbol Meaning
 ot Expected present value of being in G\ given the strategy under consideration
 ? Expected present value of being in G2 given the strategy under consideration
 ? Discount rate
 ti Probability of inspection for facilities in G\
 p Probability of inspection for facilities in G2
 a Cost of auditing per period
 c Cost of abatement per period
 F Fine for an unremediated spill
 g Probability that facilities in G2 that are found in compliance will transition to G\
 G\ "Good" group: the group of facilities with relatively good compliance records
 G2 "Bad" or targeted group: the group of facilities with relatively bad compliance records
 k Cost of remediating a spill
 p Probability that a spill occurs
 q Probability that facilities in G2 that disclose a spill will transition to G\
 R Reduced fine for disclosed spill
 Z Fine for lack of abatement
 although in that model there are two mechanisms by which a facility could violate the same
 regulation. In this model, the two types of violations are independent of each other.
 For the deliberate violation I assume that regulations require a facility to abate pollution
 at a cost of c per period, with abatement costs differing across regulated facilities.15 If a facility
 does not abate pollution and is inspected, this deliberate violation will be discovered and the
 facility will be fined Z.16 Because lack of abatement can only be detected in the period in which
 it is committed, if the facility is not inspected, it cannot be fined for its current lack of
 abatement. Facilities are also subject to a probabilistic event (e.g., a spill) that occurs with
 probability p and will inadvertently render the facility noncompliant. To discover whether the
 event has occurred, facilities must conduct an audit at a cost of a.17 Returning to compliance
 costs k, but once remediated the violation cannot be detected by regulators.18 If the event
 occurs and a facility does not remediate but is inspected, it is assessed a fine F. For simplicity,
 let F include the cost of remediation {k) as well as a punitive fine. Alternatively, if the facility
 discovers the occurrence, remediates, and discloses it to regulators, the facility receives a fine R.
 Because R does not include the cost of remediation, R + k must be less than F. To be consistent
 with EPA's Audit Policy, facilities must make the disclosure decision prior to an inspection
 occurring. Facilities cannot disclose deliberate violations to receive a reduced fine.
 15 Because there are no interactions between facilities, facility subscripts are suppressed to simplify notation. Table 1
 presents a list of the notation used in the model.
 16 This is a significant departure from Harrington's model where fines are dependent on a facility's group. In that model,
 maximum deterrence is achieved when the fine is set at 0 for facilities in G\ and at the maximum possible level for
 facilities in G2. However, Raymond (1999) shows that when facilities have heterogeneous costs (as is possible in this
 model), the optimal fine for G\ depends on the distribution of costs. As discussed in section 4, given the complexity of
 this model, solving for the optimal fine level is beyond the scope of this paper. Because allowing fines to vary across
 the two groups will not qualitatively change the results of the analysis, I have chosen to simplify the model and keep
 the fines the same for each group.
 17 This assumption is consistent with Mishra, Newman, and Stinson (1997) and Freisen (2006).
 18 If a probabilistic violation could be detected after remediation, facilities would not audit unless they planned to
 disclose any discovered violations.
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 Table 2. Transition Matrix for Each Target Group
 ? w ? , r. .- c Starting in G\ Starting in G? Regulator s Information tor ___ _ _
 Period / Stay in G\ Move to G2 Move to G\ Stay in G2
 i. Compliance 1 0 g 1 - g
 ii. Violation 0 10 1
 iii. Disclosure 1 0 q 1 ? q
 iv. No information 10 0 1
 Each period, regulators receive one of four possible signals about the facility's compliance
 status:
 i. Compliance: The facility is inspected and there are no detected violations,
 ii. Violation: The facility is inspected and a violation (deliberate and/or inadvertent) is
 detected,
 iii. Disclosure: The facility discloses an inadvertent violation and there is no deliberate
 violation (either because the facility abated or because there is no inspection),
 iv. No information: The facility does not disclose and there is no inspection.
 Note that this information structure assumes that regulators do not distinguish between types of
 violations for targeting purposes. The transition matrix presented in Table 2 shows the probability
 that a facility in Group / moves to Group y for the next period given the regulator's signal.
 With no information, the facility's group does not change. Facilities in G2 that are found in
 compliance will move to G\ with probability g. Facilities found to be in violation will be in G2 next
 period, regardless of their starting point. Finally, facilities that disclose but have not been found
 to be in violation through an inspection will stay in Gx if they begin in G\ and will move to G\ with
 probability q if they begin in G2.19 Assuming that inspection probabilities and fines are constant,
 as long as future payoffs are discounted by ? where 0 < ? < 1, Harrington (1988) shows that the
 optimal facility policy is a stationary policy and is independent of the initial state of the system.
 With respect to deliberate violations, the facility has two possible choices, to abate or to
 pollute. With respect to the probabilistic violations, the facility must make three decisions: (i)
 whether to audit; (ii) whether to remediate a violation is one if discovered; and (iii) whether to
 disclose a violation.20 If a facility decides not to audit, it has no more decisions to make. If it
 does audit, it can choose to remediate but conceal the violation, remediate and disclose the
 violation, or to not remediate and not disclose. This is consistent with EPA's Audit Policy, as
 remediation is required as a part of disclosure. However, auditing without remediation or
 disclosure is dominated by not auditing because the facility saves the cost of auditing with no
 change in the probability of detection. Thus, there are three viable actions with respect to
 probabilistic violations: no audit; audit-remediate-conceal; or audit-remediate-disclose.21
 19 Allowing regulators to move facilities that disclose in G\ to G2 with some positive probability does not qualitatively
 change the results although it does slightly complicate the model. Therefore, I assume that this does not occur.
 20 For some violations, such as recordkeeping violations, it may not be possible to "remediate" without disclosure.
 21 Because facilities that disclose in G2 increase the likelihood that they will transition back to G\, a facility might want to
 fake a probabilistic violation, that is disclose when a violation has not occurred. To ensure that this does not occur, the
 regulator could set q and R so that fraudulent reporting is never optimal. Alternatively, the regulator could verify that
 disclosures are valid and impose further fines on any facility that fraudulently reports a violation. Rather than add
 additional complexity to the model, I assume that the penalty for fraudulent reporting is high enough to ensure that
 facilities do not fraudulently report.
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 Table 3. Expected Costs for Each Strategy
 Strategy Cost Starting in Gx Cost Starting in G2
 (i) Abate/no audit c + pnF + /m8? + (1 - /?7i)Sa c + ppF + /?8? + (1 - p){\ - p)8? +
 (1 - p)9{\ - g) 8? +
 (1 - p)pgba
 (ii) Pollute/no audit nZ + pnF + 7i8? + (1 - n)t}a pZ + ppF + 8?
 (iii) Abate/conceal c + ?z +/>/: + 8oc c + a + pk + pg"8oc + (1 - pg)5?
 (iv) Pollute/conceal a + pk + nZ + 7i5? + (1 - n)Sa a + pk + pZ + 8?
 (v) Abate/disclose c + ? + p{k + 7?) + 8oc c + a +p{k + i?) + /?(1 - q) 8? + (1 -
 /0(1 - P)8? + (1 - p)p{\ - g)S?
 + pq8a + (1 - /?)pg8a
 (vi) Pollute/disclose a + p{k + R) + tcZ + 7i8? ? + /?(& + 7?) + pZ + p8? + (1 - p)
 + (1 - tt)8oc (1 - p)o? +/7(1 - p)(l - q?? +
 (1 - p)#Sa
 Combining these actions with the actions for deliberate violations yields six possible strategy
 combinations:
 i. Abate/no audit
 ii. Pollute/no audit
 iii. Abate/conceal
 iv. Pollute/conceal
 v. Abate/disclose
 vi. Pollute/disclose
 Given these strategies, one can write down the expected cost of each strategy based on
 whether the facility is in G\ or G2. For example, a facility that undertakes a strategy of abating
 but not auditing (strategy 1) if it is in Gi will have the following expected cost:
 c+^[7i(F + 8?) + (l-7i)8a] + (l-/?)8a = c+^T?JF+/?7i;8?+(l-^7r)8a,
 where a is the expected present value of being in G\ given the strategy being considered and ? is
 the expected present value of being in G2 given the strategy being considered. Under this
 strategy, the facility pays c to abate. Additionally, because it does not audit, with probability pn
 the facility is inspected and found to be in violation, fined F, and put into G2 for the following
 period; with probability p{\ ? n) it is in violation but not inspected and thus stays in G\, and
 with probability (1 - p), there is no violation, so it also stays in G\ regardless of whether it is
 inspected. Using the same logic, one can develop the expected cost of each strategy for each
 initial starting point as shown in Table 3. The facility then has 36 possible policies denoted by
 fj, where / describes the strategy taken in G\ and j describes the strategy taken in G2. To
 evaluate the expected cost of each policy, one solves the system of equations formed by taking
 the expected cost of strategy / using Gx as a starting point and the expected cost of strategy j
 using G2 as a starting point.22
 Some of the expected cost functions are very straightforward. For example, a facility that
 chooses a policy of abatement and disclosure in both groups (/55) is always in full compliance
 22 The expected costs of the 36 facility policies are available from the author on request.
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 Table 4. Optimal Facility Policies as a Function of Audit and Abatement Costs
 Abatement Costs
 Audit Costs Low: nZ > c Moderate: pZ > c > nZ High: c > pZ
 ^43? f*5 /*3 ? ^44? ^45 ? /t6
 /l35/l5?/23?/25 /i3?/i4j /l5?/l6j fl^flA,
 fl5, fid
 f\\<> f\?? f\5i fl\<> f21* f25 /ll?/l2? /l3>/l5?/l6> /2b
 _/22> /23> /25> /26_
 1 = abate/no audit, 2 = pollute/no audit, 3 = abate/conceal, 4 = pollute/conceal, 5 = abate/disclose, 6 = pollute/
 disclose.
 a Will only occur under very restrictive conditions. Details are available from the author on request.
 and has an expected present value cost of
 c + a+p(k + R)
 1-8
 However, other policies have much more complicated expected costs because the regulated
 facility will move in and out of the two groups based on inspections and disclosures. For
 example, the expected cost of policy f23, where a facility neither abates nor audits in G\ but
 abates and discloses in G2 is
 (nZ + npF)(l-S+pc)q+(\-p)c)pg) + {c + a+pk+pR)c)n
 (1-S)(1-8 + 871+/%+(l-/?)Spg)
 if the facility begins in G\ and
 (nZ + %pF)(jty+{\-p)brg) + (c + a+pk+pR){\-b + bn)
 (1 ?S)(l -8 + 871 +p8q+(l-p)&pg)
 if the facility begins in G2. Each of these expressions contains {nZ + npF), the expected cost of
 carrying out the policy in G\, and {c + a +pk + pR), the expected cost of carrying out the policy
 in G2. Note that the fraction of the time the facility spends in each group depends on the group
 in which the facility starts, the probability of inspection in each group, and the transition
 probabilities.
 Given the regulator's targeting plan and the facility's costs, the goal of the facility is to
 choose the policy that minimizes the present value of expected costs. One policy can be
 immediately ruled out as nonoptimal. Abatement and disclosure regardless of group (/55) is
 strictly dominated by abatement and auditing-remediation-concealment in both groups (/33)
 because the only advantage to disclosure in this model is that one may receive some benefit in
 terms of moving out of G2 to Gx.23 However, because the facility is always in compliance, it
 receives no benefit from being in the nontarget group.
 Which facility policy will ultimately be most profitable depends on the relative costs of
 abatement and auditing as shown in Table 4. Because auditing without remediation is never
 optimal, in the following discussion the cost of remediation is subsumed in the cost of auditing.
 As long as audit costs are low, facilities will always audit. However, whether they will abate or
 Low: /33
 npF > a + pk
 Moderate: /n,/i5
 ppF > a + pk > npF
 High: fu, f\3, fis
 a + pk > ppF
 23 Given the assumption that after remediation a probabilistic violation cannot be detected, there are no other benefits to
 disclosure. If corrected violations can be detected and fined, disclosure would provide additional benefits.
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 Figure 1. Optimal facility behavior under selected regulatory parameters. Z :
 0.9; 7i = 0.05; p = 0.25; g = 0.2; R = 100; q = 0.8.
 1000;/7 = 0.05; F= 10,000; ? -
 disclose depends on abatement costs and fines for disclosed violations. As long as abatement
 costs are low, facilities will always abate but whether they will audit and disclose depends on the
 relative costs of auditing and the fines for disclosed violations. When both audit and abatement
 costs are low, facilities will always audit and abate, but will not disclose because facilities do not
 care about the probability of inspection. When neither audit or abatement costs are low, the
 optimal strategy is more difficult to determine and depends not only on the relative costs of
 auditing and abatement, but also on the rates at which facilities are moved between the two
 groups and the fines imposed for disclosed violations.
 Figure 1 shows the optimal facility behavior for a given set of regulatory parameters.24 In
 this example, behaviors range from complete compliance (f33) to complete noncompliance {f22),
 with a wide range of policies in between. However, not all of the policies listed in Table 4 occur
 under this particular regulatory regime. Because self-policing is inexpensive {R is small) and
 provides significant benefits {q is large), the policies f24 and/44 that do not include disclosure in
 the target group are dominated by analogous policies that do,/26 and/46. If R were larger and q
 smaller, f24 and/44 would replace f26 and/46, although the boundaries between the other policies
 would change as well. There are three other policies listed in Table 4 that do not occur in
 Figure 1?/i2, /i4, and /16. These policies all call for abatement in the nontarget group but
 deliberate violation in the nontarget group. These strategies are optimal only under very
 restrictive conditions on the parameters, and thus, while they are theoretically possible, they are
 unlikely to occur.25
 24 The selection of parameter values was made to demonstrate the wide range of policies that could be optimal for a
 given regulatory regime.
 25 Details are available from the author on request.
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 Table 5. Possible Changes in Facility Behavior When Self-Policing Is Rewarded
 Abatement Costs
 Audit Costs
 Low
 nZ > c
 Moderate
 pZ > c > nZ
 High
 c > pZ
 Low:
 npF > a + pk
 Moderate:
 ppF > a + pk
 > npF
 High:
 a + pk > ppF
 No change
 Increased
 disclosures in G2
 Increased audits
 and disclosures
 in G2
 Increased
 disclosures in G2
 Increased
 disclosures in G2;
 decreased
 abatement in Gj
 Increased audits
 and disclosures
 in G2, decreased
 abatement in G\
 Increased disclosures in G2,
 increased or decreased
 abatement in G2
 Increased disclosures in G2;
 decreased abatement in G\d\
 increased or decreased
 abatement in G2
 Increased audits and disclosures
 in G2; decreased abatement in
 GXa', increased or decreased
 abatement in G2
 1 Theoretically abatement can increase in G\, but this will only occur under very restrictive conditions. Details are
 available from the author on request.
 5. Implications of Self-Policing for Environmental Performance
 As shown in Table 4, a targeted enforcement regime with self-policing can elicit a wide
 range of behavior. To evaluate the implications of self-policing for environmental performance,
 we thus need to consider how introducing self-policing changes facility behavior. To determine
 what facilities will do in the absence of self-policing, I set the penalty for disclosed violations
 equal to the penalty for detected violations {k + R = F) and keep all facilities that disclose in the
 target group in the target group for the next period {q = 0). We can then compare the optimal
 facility policy with and without self-policing to determine the effect that self-policing has on
 compliance behavior. Table 5 summarizes the changes in optimal facility behavior that can
 occur when self-policing is introduced.
 When there is no self-policing, all policies that involve disclosure are dominated by
 analogous policies that involve concealment. Obviously the introduction of self-policing will
 increase the number of disclosures; although, some facilities will continue to not disclose either
 because of the relative cost of auditing and disclosing or because they have nothing to gain
 from disclosure. While regulators are likely to value the disclosures themselves as a valuable
 source of information, introducing self-policing will also increase the number of facilities that
 audit, which in turn will increase the number of facilities that promptly remediate probabilistic
 violations. As shown in Table 5, this increase in auditing will occur at some facilities with high
 audit costs; although, it will only occur when the facilities are in the target group because the
 self-policing policy modeled in this paper does not benefit facilities in the nontarget group.
 Introducing self-policing can also change the incentives for a facility to deliberately violate
 regulations. Interestingly, depending on a facility's costs and the reward to self-policing, self
 policing can serve as both a substitute for and a complement to abatement. To illustrate this point,
 consider Figure 2, which shows how the introduction of self-policing affects optimal facility
 behavior for the same set of regulatory parameters used in Figure 1. The solid lines show how the
 space is partitioned prior to the implementation of self-policing, and the dashed lines show how the
 space is partitioned after self-policing is introduced. For each region, the first policy listed is the
 optimal policy without self-policing, and the second is the optimal policy with self-policing.
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 Figure 2. Effect of self-policing under selected regulatory parameters. In each region, the first policy listed is the
 optimal policy before self-policing and the second is the optimal policy under self-policing. Parameters before self
 policing: Z = 1000;/? = 0.05; F = 10,000; ? = 0.9; n = 0.05; p = 0.25; g = 0.2; R = 10,000; q = 0. Parameters
 under self-policing: Z = 1000; p = 0.05; F = 10,000; ? = 0.9; n = 0.05; p - 0.25; g = 0.2; R = 100; q = 0.8.
 Recall that facilities in the target group can transition to the nontarget group either
 through a clean inspection report or through a voluntary disclosure. For some facilities,
 disclosing a violation may be a more cost-effective pathway back to the nontarget group than
 abatement, and thus they may substitute disclosure for abatement in the target group. In
 Figure 2, this type of substitution is shown by the two small regions near the top-left side of the
 figure. Some facilities with low audit costs and high abatement costs switch from/43 to f46 when
 self-policing is introduced, and some facilities with moderate audit costs and high abatement
 costs switch from/23 to/26- While the exact size of the region in which this type of substitution
 can occur will depend on the parameters of the model, the range over which it occurs is always
 relatively small. However, it is important to remember we do not know the underlying
 distribution of facility audit and abatement costs. Therefore, even though the range of costs
 over which a particular policy is optimal may be limited, there could be a significant number of
 facilities in any given region of the figure.
 Self-policing in the target group can also serve as a substitute for abatement in the
 nontarget group. In Figure 2 there are two regions where this occurs: The two areas on either
 side of the ppFline near the bottom of the figure. In the area to the left of the ppFline, facilities
 switch from/i3 to/25 when self-policing is introduced, and in the area to the right, facilities
 switch from/11 to/25. Without self-policing, these facilities abate in the nontarget group to
 avoid being moved to the target group. However, because in this example self-policing offers a
 relatively reliable pathway back to the nontarget group, when self-policing is introduced these
 facilities no longer find it necessary to abate when they are in the nontarget group. The range of
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 costs for which this type of substitution will occur is generally small; although, it does vary
 depending on the parameters of the model.
 To demonstrate how self-policing can complement abatement, consider the triangular area
 near the upper-right side of Figure 2. Facilities in this area use /22 when self-policing is not
 possible but/25 when self-policing is possible. Thus, when self-policing is not rewarded, neither
 auditing nor abating in the target group is cost-effective. When self-policing is rewarded, these
 facilities find it optimal to do both. The intuition behind this result is that for a disclosure to
 benefit a facility, the facility cannot be found to be in deliberate violation during an inspection.
 Thus, for some facilities, the combination of disclosing and abating maximizes their net
 benefit.26 Once again, the range over which disclosure and abatement are complements is
 generally small, although it varies based on the parameters of the model.
 In summary, the introduction of self-policing can change facility behavior in a number of
 different ways. On the positive side, it can increase the level of auditing, disclosures, and
 abatement. On the negative side, it may result in a decrease in abatement. The extent to which
 each of these effects will occur will depend on the design of the self-policing policy (i.e., the
 setting of R and q), other enforcement parameters {g, n, p, F, and Z), and most importantly, the
 underlying distribution of audit and abatement costs. Moreover, whether a self-policing policy
 will provide increased environmental protection will depend not only on those factors, but also
 the benefit to the environment from increased auditing, disclosure, and abatement.
 Because data on the joint distribution of abatement and audit costs, as well as the relative
 benefit from auditing (i.e., remediation of probabilistic violations), disclosure, and abatement
 are not readily available, it is not possible to theoretically estimate the overall effect of EPA's
 current audit policy on environmental performance. However, we can examine the potential
 effect that various enforcement policy changes would have on the level of auditing, disclosure,
 and abatement. Table 6 summarizes these effects.27 First consider those parameters specific to
 the audit policy: R and q. Decreasing R, the fine associated with a disclosed violation, will
 obviously lead to more disclosures in the target group.28 Additionally, decreasing R can lead to
 more audits (and thus higher levels of remediation) at facilities in the target group. However, a
 decrease in R also can lead to a decrease in abatement in the nontarget group because a lower R
 provides a cheaper pathway back into G\ for facilities that are moved to G2 because of
 noncompliance or lower levels of abatement in G2 as disclosure becomes a more cost-effective
 substitute for abatement in the target group. Finally, it is possible that a decrease in R could
 lead to an increase in abatement in G2 because auditing and abatement can be complements.
 Increasing q, the probability that a facility that discloses in G2 will be moved to G\, has the same
 qualitative effect as a decrease in R: It will increase audits and disclosures in G2, decrease
 abatement in the nontarget group, and either increase or decrease abatement in G2.
 Next consider those parameters that are not specific to self-policing. As in a targeted
 enforcement model without self-policing, increasing g (the probability that a facility in G2 with a
 clean inspection report will be moved into G\) increases abatement at facilities in G2 but can lead
 to less abatement in G\ because it provides an easier path back to Gx for facilities that are moved
 to G2 because of noncompliance. Moreover, increasing g when self-policing is possible can lead to
 26 Although theoretically the introduction of self-policing could result in an increase in abatement from the nontarget
 group when abatement costs are high, this can only occur under very restrictive and arguably unreasonable parameter
 conditions.
 27 Formal proof is available from the author on request.
 28 Facilities in the nontarget group will never disclose as long as R is greater than 0.
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 Table 6. Effect of Policy Parameters on Audits, Disclosures, and Abatement
 Possible Effect of Parameter Change on
 Parameter Change  Audits  Disclosures  Abatement
 Decrease R, fine for
 disclosed violations
 Increase q, probability
 facility disclosing in G2
 moves to G\
 Increase g, probability
 facility with clean
 inspection in G2 moves
 to Gi
 Increase n, probability of
 inspection in G\
 Increase p, probability of
 inspection in G2
 Increase F, fine for
 detected probabilistic
 violations
 Increase Z, fine for lack
 of abatement
 G\. no change
 G2: increase
 G\. no change
 G2: increase
 G\. no change
 G2: increase
 G\. no change
 G2: increase
 G\. decrease
 G2: increase/decrease
 G\. decrease
 G2: increase/decrease
 G\. no change G\. no change G\\ decrease
 G2: increase/decrease G2: increase/decrease G2: increase
 G\. increase G\. no change
 G2: decrease G2: decrease
 G\: no change G\\ no change
 G2: increase/decrease G2: increase/decrease
 G\\ increase G\\ no change
 G2: increase G2: increase/decrease
 G\. increase/decrease
 G2: decreasea
 G\. increase/decrease
 G2: increasea
 G\\ increase/decrease
 G2: increase/decrease
 G\. no change G\\ no change G\. increase
 G2: increase/decrease G2: increase/decrease G2: increase
 Under very restrictive conditions, the opposite effect could occur. Details are available from the author on request.
 fewer disclosures and audits in G2 if it is cheaper to return to Gi via a clean inspection rather than
 through a disclosure. However, because abatement and audits can be complements, increasing g
 could lead to increased audits and disclosures in G2 under the right parameter conditions.
 Increasing the inspection rate in the nontarget group, n, decreases the relative costs of both
 audits and abatement in the nontarget group and thus can lead to an increase in audits and/or
 abatement in G\. However, because audits and abatement can be substitutes for each other, as
 auditing in Gi becomes cheaper, abatement in Gi could decrease. Moreover, some facilities may
 substitute audits in Gi for abatement or disclosures in G2. Similarly, as abatement in Gi becomes
 cheaper, facilities may substitute abatement in Gi for audits and disclosures in G2. Finally, as the
 benefit of being in the nontarget group decreases (i.e., as n approaches p), facilities in the target
 group will be less willing to invest in abatement or disclosures in the hopes of being moved back to
 the nontarget group. Thus, even if auditing and abatement do not change in Gi, we could see a
 further decrease in audits, disclosures, and abatement in G2 because increasing n without
 increasing p decreases the leverage of a targeted enforcement regime.29 Increasing p, the inspection
 rate in the target group, decreases the relative costs of both audits and abatement in the target
 group and thus can lead to an increase in audits, disclosures, or abatement in G2. Additionally,
 increasing p increases the leverage of the target enforcement regime because it increases the costs of
 being in the target group relative to the nontarget group. Therefore, we may also see an increase in
 abatement in the nontarget group. However, as abatement in G2 becomes cheaper, facilities may
 substitute abatement in G2 for audits and disclosures in G2 or for abatement in Gi.30
 29 It is possible that facilities might choose to switch from disclosing in the target group to abating in the target group as
 71 increases. However, this could only occur for a very small set of parameters and abatement costs.
 30 Although it is also possible that as auditing in G2 becomes cheaper, abatement in G2 could decrease; the conditions for
 this to occur are quite restrictive.
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 Increasing F, the fine for detected (as opposed to disclosed) probabilistic violations,
 decreases the relative cost of audits and thus can lead to an increase in audits in both groups
 and an increase in disclosures in the target group. Additionally, because increasing F increases
 the cost of the target group for facilities that do not audit in that group, some facilities begin to
 abate in the nontarget group. On the other hand, for facilities that do not audit in the nontarget
 group, increasing F increases the cost of the nontarget group, which will decrease the incentives
 for firms to disclose or abate in the target group. Moreover, if audits and abatement are
 substitutes, an increase in F can lead to a decrease in abatement in both groups. On the other
 hand, for some facilities in the target group, audits and abatement may be complements, so
 increasing F could lead to an increase in abatement in the target group.
 Increasing Z, the fine for lack of abatement, decreases the relative cost of abatement and
 thus can lead to an increase in abatement in both groups. Additionally, because increasing Z
 increases the cost of the target group for facilities that do not abate in that group, some
 facilities will begin to audit and possibly disclose in the target group. However, if audits and
 abatement are substitutes, increasing Z can lead to a decrease in audits and disclosures in the
 target group. On the other hand, for some facilities in the target group, audits and abatement
 can be complements so increasing Z could lead to an increase in audits and disclosures in the
 target group.
 As shown in Table 6, none of the possible parameter changes will have a purely positive
 effect on environmental performance. Thus, in designing a self-policing policy, the regulator
 must recognize the trade-offs between increasing auditing, disclosures, and abatement. In
 particular, many of the policy changes that increase auditing and disclosures will decrease
 abatement and vice versa. If the goal of the regulator is to increase the remediation of
 probabilistic violations by increasing the number of facilities that audit, increasing F, the fine
 for probabilistic violations, can increase audits in both the target and nontarget groups.
 Although this will not necessarily result in an increase in disclosures, it would increase the
 remediation of probabilistic violations and thus could result in a significant increase in
 environmental protection if such violations are likely to cause serious harm to the environment.
 Additionally, such a change would not necessarily cause a decrease in abatement because
 auditing and abatement can be complements to each other. Of course, there are limits to a
 regulator's ability to raise penalties that are not represented in this model but are well-discussed
 within the literature.31
 Alternatively, decreasing the fine for disclosed violations R and increasing the probability
 that a facility that discloses in the target group q will increase both audits and disclosures at
 facilities in the target group but will not affect auditing in the nontarget group. However, such
 actions are likely to result in decreased abatement because facilities can use disclosures to
 decrease the probability of future enforcement actions.32 This effect is consistent with Pfaff and
 Sanchirico's (2004) proposition that facilities might use the disclosure of minor violations as
 "red herrings" to discourage inspections or distract regulators from other problems.
 Table 6 also highlights the fact that increases in auditing will not necessarily be
 accompanied by increases in disclosures. For example, increasing F could result in more audits
 but fewer disclosures. Thus, any analysis of the effectiveness of a self-policing policy should not
 31 In fact, Harrington's (1988) original model was developed in part to examine how to leverage enforcement resources
 when penalties are restricted.
 32 Additionally, such changes could increase the incentive for a facility to fraudulently disclose a violation.
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 use disclosures as a sole measure of the policy's effectiveness. While the introduction of a self
 policing policy will result in an initial increase in disclosures, changes in an enforcement regime
 over time could result in fewer disclosures but a higher level of environmental protection.
 Finally, note that changes to policy parameters that are external to the self-policing policy will
 have an ambiguous effect on auditing and disclosure. Thus, any proposed changes to the
 overall enforcement regime should be examined carefully for their possible impact on auditing
 and disclosure.
 6. Conclusions
 This paper presents a theoretical model of self-policing in a targeted enforcement regime.
 The model was designed to closely follow the design of EPA's audit policy, particularly the idea
 that self-policing may affect future enforcement. As expected, rewarding facilities that disclose
 with lower penalties and more lenient future enforcement increases the incentives to both audit
 and disclose. Because increased audits lead to increased remediation, self-policing can increase
 environmental protection. Additionally, disclosures themselves may be valuable to regulators
 as a source of information or if remediation requires disclosure (as would be the case with
 reporting violations). These results are consistent with many other theoretical models of self
 policing. However, adding a dynamic aspect to self-policing and including both deliberate and
 inadvertent violations reveals new ways in which self-policing can affect facility behavior. On
 the positive side, self-policing can be complementary to other types of compliance and could
 increase environmental performance in areas that are not subject to self-policing. On the
 negative side, self-policing can be a substitute for other types of compliance and could therefore
 be detrimental to environmental protection. The model also demonstrates that changes to
 enforcement policies can have spillover effects, and thus proposed changes to enforcement
 policies should consider the effect on facilities' incentives to audit and self-police.
 Finally, in this model, designing the optimal enforcement regimes and self-policing policy
 requires information about the joint distribution of different types of compliance costs. This
 suggests that more focused self-policing policies?either for specific industries or specific
 media?might be better able to increase environmental protection than a policy that applies
 equally to all facilities and all media. In the United States, many media programs do have self
 policing policies in addition to the Audit Policy. However, because environmental audits are
 generally conducted for all environmental processes at a facility, too much differentiation
 across media programs could affect a facility's overall incentives to audit.
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